SOAC-Net: A model to manage service-based business process authorization by Sun, Haiyang et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Engineering - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences 
1-1-2012 







University of Wollongong, wzhao@uow.edu.au 
Sanjay K. Nepal 
CSIRO 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/engpapers 
 Part of the Engineering Commons 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/engpapers/5205 
Recommended Citation 
Sun, Haiyang; Yang, Jian; Zhao, Weiliang; and Nepal, Sanjay K.: SOAC-Net: A model to manage service-
based business process authorization 2012, 376-383. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/engpapers/5205 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
SOAC-Net: A Model to Manage Service-Based Business Process Authorization






University of Wollongong, Australia
wzhao@uow.edu.au
Surya Nepal
CSIRO ICT Centre, Sydney, Australia
Surya.Nepal@csiro.au
Abstract—Business process (BP) can be supported by a large
number of resources with evolving contents. In order to receive
the support from these resources, the BP must satisfy the
authorization policies of these resources. On the other hand,
a BP also has its own authorization policies that users must
satisfy in order to interact with the BP. Meanwhile, execution
policies need to be applied to manage the sequence of tasks
invocations in a BP. Therefore, without proper coordination
among these policies, BP may not be able to perform correctly,
e.g., imperative support from a specific resource could be
missing or unauthorized user access can occur. An effective
authorization management bringing all types of policies to-
gether becomes a must for a BP executing correctly without
breaking any authorization and business rules. In this paper,
we propose a process model, SOAC-Net that is incorporated
with an authorization model, Process-Aware Service-Oriented
Authorization Control (PASOAC). PASOAC is an extension of
Role Based Access Control (RBAC), which takes both resource
and user into account. A set of authorization constraints are
designed in PASOAC to coordinate the user access and the
resource support in a process environment.
Keywords: Authorization, Authorization Policy, Business Pro-
cess.
I. INTRODUCTION
A business process (BP) in modern organization can be
operated in a distributed environment involving multiple
parties with dynamic availability and a large number of
resources with evolving contents. These resources can be
various types of applications that come from different or-
ganizations, e.g., web services. Therefore, these resources
can belong to different security domains, and have different
security and interest requirements. In order to acquire the
support from these resources, a BP must be able to satisfy
these resources’ authorization policies. On the other hand,
interacting with user is imperative for the execution of
BP. But the user can access the specific process functions,
only after it can satisfy the process’s authorization policies.
Execution policies are used to manage the sequence of
tasks invocations within a BP, i.e., business logic. Therefore,
without coordination on these policies, a BP may not be
able to perform properly. For example, supposing a task
in a BP can only be invoked once, if no proper policies
coordination is put in place, multiple invocations by the
same user can occur. Supposing task A and task B are a
pair of sequenced tasks in a BP. Multiple users can invoke
Figure 1. Execution Sequence of Financial Lease
task A; while task B can only be accessed by one user. A
constraint is set up in the BP as the user who can invoke
task B must have already invoked task A. Now if task A
is accessed by a user who is not granted permission to
invoke task B, then no any other user is allowed to access
task B. So BP is discontinued. Such dependency between
user accesses also need to be identified between resource
supports, and even between user access and resource support
which makes policy coordination complex. How to manage
the user accesses and the resource supports in a BP in
a distributed environment, e.g., web service domain, then
becomes an issue that is not tackled yet. Let us take a
motivating example.
A. Motivating Example
Financial Lease is a BP that can provide the business
equipment finance and leasing solutions in web service
domain (See Fig. 1). When Financial Lease receives a lease
application from a customer, it firstly assesses the value of
the product that the customer wants to lease from a supplier
and seeks a specific funder who can provide financial
support. A guarantor for the customer must be confirmed to
lower the risk of bad debt. Customer and his/her lawyer can
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confirm the lease application, once the credit history checks
of customer and guarantor are finished. The repayment on
the leased product will be paid regularly. After the agreed
period, the customer or his/her lawyer can advice Financial
Lease a lease finalization notice that enables Financial Lease
to start the internal finalization process. The customer has
two after-lease options, (1) purchase the product with a
small-amount cost, or (2) return the product. Regarding to
the purchase, funder will evaluate the cost to be paid by
the customer; while for returning the product, supplier will
carry out the maintenance check on the product. The whole
lease process is terminated after the purchase or the return.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate an execution sequence of Fi-
nancial Lease. Each operation (also known as task) of
Financial Lease is depicted as a rectangle in the process.
A User table is used to illustrate three types of users,
Customer, Guarantor, and Lawyer that are depicted
as the columns of the table, and each row of the table
corresponds to specific operation in Financial Lease. A
white circle in the table indicates that the type of user
(Column) can access the operation (Row); while black cross
means that the operation can not be accessed by specific user.
Four types of resources, Funder, Supplier, Lease
Agent, and Credit Assessor, are illustrated in Re-
source table in Fig. 1. The circles with horizon stripes in
resource table represent that this type of resource (Column)
can support the specific operation (Row); while black crosses
in Resource table share the same semantics of black crosses
in User table. The sequence of interactions among users,
resources, and Financial Lease is numbered in Fig. 1 as a
set of operation invocations. The requirements for accessing
and supporting Financial Lease are described below,
• User: (1) Customer should be able to access all
operations. (2)Guarantor Confirmation can only be
made by guarantor. Guarantor can start the lease
on behalf of the customer and help to repay the rental.
(3) Lawyer after lease finalization stage can, on behalf
of its client, deal with any rest activities. Furthermore,
lawyer is necessary to involve in operations of Lease
Confirmation and Lease Finalization with customer.
• Resource: (1) Funder is used to provide financial
support. (2) Supplier is the product provider. (3)
Lease Agent can provide both product and fund to
Financial Lease, since the lease agent will seek
its own funder and supplier. (4) Credit Assessor
can evaluate the credit histories of guarantor and
customer.
Based on the above example, we can observe that, (1) an
operation within the BP can be accessed and supported by
multiple types of users and resources, and (2) the inherently
business logic (execution policy) set up within BP of Fi-
nancial Lease requires the compliance of the user accesses
and the resource supports. Hence, an effective authorization
management should be performed on coordinating the user
accesses and the resource supports in a process environment.
Otherwise, authorization issues can be raised to cease pro-
cess execution.
Restricting when the user accesses and the resource
supports can/can’t be used on specific operation during the
execution of BP is an initial step to maintain the BP running
properly. For example, supposing the Guarantor finishes
accessing the operation Guarantor Confirmation, the permis-
sion to access this operation should be revoked immediately
from the Guarantor to avoid repeated submissions of
guarantor information. Furthermore, although multiple users
or resources can access or support the same operations, not
all of them can become effective which may suspend the
execution of BP. In Fig. 1, Monthly Bill operation can be
supported by Funder or Lease Agent and accessed by
Customer or Guarantor. To avoid fraudulent activity, A
guarantor can pay the rental on behalf of the customer
to access the Monthly Bill operation only if the bill is
issued by a funder, rather than a lease agent, i.e.,
during the execution of operation Monthly Bill, the invo-
cation by Guarantor depends on the Funder support.
This constraint is used when an entity can play as both
lease agent and guarantor. Obviously, if the entity
pays the bill issued by itself, it may eventually do harm
to customer’s interest. Funder as the financial provider
can not play as guarantor. Hence, the Guarantor can
pay the bill issued from Funder only. In a summary,
Guarantor becomes ineffective if the operation monthly
bill is supported by Lease Agent. Supposing Customer
also can not be used due to another dependency restriction,
the BP will be suspended since both users, Customer
and Guarantor, become unavailable to invoke operation
Monthly Bill.
Therefore, we can conclude that, the user accesses and
the resource supports are not only regulated by specific
authorization policies to guide what the user can access and
what the resource can support. They are also restricted by the
business constraints enacted during the execution of business
process to maintain the security in a process environment.
These business constraints can be categorized as follows,
• Synchronization: The sequence of the user accesses
and the sequence of resource supports should both
synchronize with the execution sequence of the oper-
ations in BP. When an operation is ready to execute
in a process instance, the relevant users and resources
that can access and support the operation should be
invoked. Once the operation finishes, the permissions
assigned to user and resource to access and support the
operation should be revoked immediately. The user and
resource that can access and support the next operation
in the process instance then should be ready. In above
example, when the operation Guarantor Confirmation
starts, the authorization to access the operation should
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be granted to Guarantor. When the operation fin-
ishes, the authorization of Guarantor access on the
operation should be revoked immediately.
• Dependency: A user access or a resource support on
specific operation in a BP may depend on another
achieved user access or resource support. In above
example, the access of the Guarantor on the op-
eration of Monthly Bill depends on the support of the
Funder on the same operation. If the Funder is used
to support the Monthly Bill, then the Guarantor can
be used to access the operation. Otherwise, the access
of Guarantor on the operation of Monthly Bill should
be restricted.
In a summary, to maintain the security during the ex-
ecution of BP as motivating scenario, the accesses of
three users and the supports of four resources should be
synchronously sequenced with the BP of Financial Lease.
Within the sequence of user accesses and the sequence of
resource supports, each access and support must also satisfy
the dependency requirements to cater for business security
demands. Existing works, e.g., [7], [8], mainly focus on
managing synchronization between the execution sequence
of the operations and the sequence of user accesses. They
do not take the sequence of resources supports into account.
Furthermore, much representative research works, e.g., [9],
design constraints for avoiding conflict of interest within
the user accesses. Dependency constraint is still missing.
Particularly, dependency constraints can not only be enabled
between user accesses, but can also be executed between re-
source supports, and even between user access and resource
support, which become more complex with the involvement
of resource support management.
Hence, an authorization management based on the ex-
ecution sequence of BP should be developed to maintain
the security in a process environment. In this work, a
conceptual model named Process-Aware Service-Oriented
Authorization Control (PASOAC) is introduced to manage
authorization of business process by considering both user
access and resource support. Two types of authorization
policies, (1) Authorization Synchronization Policies and (2)
Authorization Dependence Policies, are included in the con-
ceptual model to state the above business security demands.
A process model SOAC-Net incorporated with PASOAC is
designed to represent authorization flow. An authorization
flow is the sequence of user accesses and the sequence of
resources supports with associated authorization constraints,
that is different from the control flow within normal work-
flow model, e.g., workflow-net [1]. The authorization flow
can reflect the control flow of business process by enforcing
synchronization policy. It can also enforce the dependency
policy on top of the execution policy of the BP, which
facilitates the authorization management on access control
level only without delving into task execution sequence
Figure 2. Process-Aware Service-Oriented Authorization Control
level.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the conceptual model PASOAC. Authorization
policies are also defined in this section. The specification of
SOAC-Net is described in Section 3. Section 4 overviews
some related work. Concluding remarks and discussion of
future work are presented in Section 5.
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL-PASOAC
A. Specification of Conceptual Model
In this section, we specify the PASOAC conceptual model
by using the notation of Entity-Relationship (E-R) Dia-
gram. In Fig. 2, rectangles represent elements and diamonds
represent relationships. In Fig. 2, we define Role (R) as a
type of user that requires to access the operations (Op) of
BP. Resource type (ReT) is defined as a type of resource that
can provide support on the operation (Op). Their associated
relationships, access and support, are all many-to-many (See
two blue arrows in Fig. 2). PASOAC can be formally
described as follows,
Definition 1: PASOAC is a tuple N=(R, Op, ReT, OPA,
SPA, assigned op, assigned ret)
• R, Op, ReT, are a set of elements representing Role,
Operation, and Resource Type.
• OPA ⊆Op×R, a relation to map operation to role.
• SPA ⊆Op×ReT, a relation to map operation to re-
source type.
• assigned op:(r:R) → 2Op, the mapping of role r onto
a set of operations. Formally, assigned op(r)={op∈Op
| (op, r) ∈OPA}.
• assigned ret:(ret:ReT) → 2Op, the mapping of re-
source type ret onto a set of operations. Formally,
assigned ret(ret)={op∈Op|(op, ret)∈SPA}.
In Fig. 2, two types of authorization policies are also
defined within PASOAC as constraints to restrict the use of
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role access and resource type support during the execution of
business process, that are described in the following sections.
B. Constraint I: Synchronization
A sequence of role accesses on operations of BP can be
called as role-flow, where roles are continuously used to
access the operations based on the business logic of process.
A sequence of resource type support on operations of BP can
be called as resource type-flow, where resource types repre-
senting the groups of resources provide successional support
on operations during the execution of business process. An
authorization flow consists of role-flow and resource type-
flow, and must be executed consistently with the control
flow of BP. This synchronization means that the role access
and the resource type support on specific operations can
be enabled when the operation starts to execute, and their
permission to access and support on the operation is revoked
after the operation finishes. It can guarantee that the access
and the support are available when they are needed, and no
extra permission can be granted to users and resources. Extra
permission may cause additional access and support on the
operation that may lead to security issues.
In Fig. 2, three red arrows are used to represent the
sequence of role access (role-flow), business logic of BP
(control-flow), and the sequence of resource type support
(resource type-flow) respectively. Authorization synchro-
nization policy is divided into two types, (1) Role Syn-
chronization Policy and (2) Resource Type Synchronization
Policy. Role Synchronization Policy is used to restrict the
synchronization between the role-flow and control-flow;
while Resource Type Synchronization Policy is used to
restrict the synchronization between the control-flow and
resource type-flow. These two policies are described as
follows.
Constraint 1: Role Synchronization Policy: Let OP be a
set of Operations, and R be a set of roles. Let F be a set
of execution sequences between operations, Op→Op∈F. We
say that the role-flow is consistent with control-flow, if there
exist operations opi and opj , whose execution sequence can
be recorded as opi→opj∈F, then all roles that are mapped
to opi and all roles that are mapped to opj must access
the operations opi and opj based on the same execution
sequence opi→opj∈F.
In role synchronization policy, by setting up the sequence
of role access to be consistent with the execution sequence
of the mapped operations, the synchronization between the
role-flow and the control-flow of operations is achieved. The
role can not access the operation unless it starts to execute.
When the execution of the operation finishes, the role access
on the operation is revoked. For example, the Guarantor
can start to access the operation Guarantor Confirmation
when the operation can start to execute. When the operation
Guarantor Confirmation finishes, the permission assigned
to Guarantor to access the operation should be revoked
immediately.
Constraint 2: Resource Type Synchronization Policy:
Let OP be a set of Operations, and ReT be a set of resource
types. Let F be a set of execution sequences between
operations, Op→Op∈F. We say that the resource type-flow
is consistent with control-flow, if there exist operations opi
and opj , whose execution sequence can be recorded as
opi→opj∈F, then all resource types that are mapped to opi
and all resource types that are mapped to opj must support
the operations opi and opj based on the same execution
sequence opi→opj∈F.
Resource type synchronization policy is used to synchro-
nize the sequence of resource type support with the execu-
tion sequence of operations. It requires that the resource type
can support the operation only when it is the operation’s turn
to execute. When the execution of the operation finishes, the
support of the resource type on the operation is revoked. For
example, when the operation of Lease Application starts, the
Funder should be available in terms of securing financial
support amount. After the operation finishes, the support
from Funder should be revoked immediately to avoid
the variation of the financial support amount made by the
Funder.
C. Constraint II: Dependence
Authorization Dependence Policies restrict that a role or a
resource type is not able to access or support the operations,
until the other role or the other resource type has already
accessed or supported specific operations. Authorization
Dependence Policies are separated into 5 categories, (1)
between roles, (2) between resource types, (3) between roles
and resource types, (4) between resource types and roles, and
(5) between groups of roles and resource types (See Fig. 2).
Here below, the 5 types of dependency policies are defined
as follows,
Constraint 3: Role Dependency Policy (Cr→r): Let OP
be a set of Operations, and R be a set of roles. OPA⊆R×OP
is a set of relations of assigned roles on operations. A role
dependency policy Cr→r can be written as opaa → opab,
where opaa and opab ∈OPA, and opab depends on opaa,
i.e. without opaa, opab can not be used in role-flow.
Role dependency policy (Cr→r) is used to restrict that
the role access on specific operation depends on another
role access in role-flow. This is different from role synchro-
nization policy which is used to restrict the sequence of
role accesses consistent with the execution sequence of op-
erations. Formally, when ri×opi=opaa, and rj×opj=opab,
only after opaa has been used in role-flow, then opab can
be used. For example, in motivating scenario, the access
of the guarantor on the operation of Monthly Bill de-
pends on the access of the guarantor on the operation
of Lease Application. It means that the guarantor can
repay the rental on behalf of customer only if the lease
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application is also submitted by the guarantor. A role
dependency policy can be written as Guarantor×Lease
Application→Guarantor×Monthly Bill.
Constraint 4: Resource Type Dependency Policy
(Cret→ret): Let OP be a set of Operations, and ReT be a
set of resource types. SPA⊆ReT×OP is a set of relations
of assigned resource types on operations. A resource types
dependency policy Cret→ret can be written as spaa → spab,
where spaa and spab ∈SPA, and spab depends on spaa, i.e.
without spaa, spab can not be used in resource type-flow.
Resource type dependency policy (Cret→ret) bears the
same semantics like role dependency policy (Cr→r). It is
used to restrict the support of a resource type on specific op-
eration to depend on another support of resource type within
resource type-flow. This is also different from resource type
synchronization policy which is used to restrict the sequence
of resource type support consistent with the execution se-
quence of the operations. Formally, when reti×opi=spaa,
and retj×opj=spab, only spaa has been used in resource
type-flow, then spab can be used. For example, in motivating
example, the support of lease agent on the operation of
Monthly Bill depends on the support of the lease agent
on the operation of Lease Application. It means that lease
agent can be used to issue bill only the lease agent
is used to support the lease application. A resource type
dependency policy can be written as Lease Agent×Lease
Application→Lease Agent×Monthly Bill.
Constraint 5: Role Resource Type Dependency Policy
(Cr→ret): Let OP be a set of Operations, R be a set of
roles, and ReT be a set of resource types. R×OP⊆OPA
is a set of relations of assigned roles on operations, and
ReT×OP⊆SPA is a set of relations of assigned resource
types on operations. A role resource type dependency policy
Cr→ret can be written as opaa → spaa, where opaa ∈OPA
and spaa ∈SPA, and spaa depends on opaa, i.e. without
opaa, spaa can not be used in resource type-flow.
Role resource type dependency policy (Cr→ret) is used to
restrict a support of a resource type on specific operation to
depend on a role access in role-flow. When reti×opi=spaa,
and rj×opj=opaa, Only after the role rj has been used
to access the specific operation opj , the resource type
reti can then support the operation opi. For example, in
motivating scenario, the support of credit assessor on
the operation of Lease Confirmation depends on the access
of the guarantor on the operation of the Guarantor
Confirmation. It means that, the credit assessor can
evaluate the credit history of customer and guarantor
only after the guarantor has confirmed its informa-
tion. A role resource type dependency policy can be writ-
ten as Guarantor×Guarantor Confirmation→Credit
Assessor×Lease Confirmation.
Constraint 6: Resource Type Role Dependency Policy
(Cret→r): Let OP be a set of Operations, R be a set of
roles, and ReT be a set of resource types. R×OP⊆OPA
is a set of relations of assigned roles on operations, and
ReT×OP⊆SPA is a set of relations of assigned resource
types on operations. A resource type role dependency policy
Cret→r can be written as spaa → opaa, where opaa ∈OPA
and spaa ∈SPA, and opaa depends on spaa, i.e. without
spaa, opaa can not be used in role-flow.
Resource type role dependency policy (Cret→r) is a
reverse policy of role resource type dependency policy,
in which it enables the role access on specific opera-
tion to depend on the support of a resource type. When
reti×opi=spaa, and rj×opj=opaa, only after the resource
type reti has been used to support the specific operation
opi, the role rj can then access the operation opj . In moti-
vating scenario, the access of guarantor on the operation
Monthly Bill depends on the support of funder on the op-
eration Monthly Bill. It means that the operation Monthly Bill
can be accessed by the guarantor, only after the bill has
been issued by the funder, rather than lease agent.
A resource type role dependency policy can be written as
Funder×Monthly Bill→Guarantor×Monthly Bill.
All dependency policies defined until now are used to
restrict role access and resource type support from single
element’s point of view, e.g., a role access depends on
another role access. However, they are lack of capability to
describe the dependency restriction between the groups of
role accesses and resource type supports, where a role and
a resource type are grouped and their access and support
depends on the access and support of another grouped role
and resource type.
Constraint 7: Group of Role and Resource Type Depen-
dency Policy(Cr×ret→r×ret): Let OP be a set of Operations,
R be a set of roles, and ReT be a set of resource types.
R×OP⊆OPA is a set of relations of assigned roles on
operations, and ReT×OP⊆SPA is a set of relations of
assigned resource types on operations. A group of role
and resource type dependency policy Cr×ret→r×ret can be
written as (opaa, spaa) → (opab, spab), where opaa and
opab ∈OPA, spaa and spab ∈SPA, and the group of opaa
and spaa depends on the group of opab and spab, i.e.
without both opaa and spaa, opab and spab can not both
be used in role-flow and resource type-flow, respectively.
Group of role and resource type dependency policy
(Cr×ret→r×ret) (See Fig. 2) is used to restrict a role access
and a resource type support to depend on the access and
support of another group of role and resource type. A role
and a resource type can be grouped when they are both
working on the same operation. When reti×opi=spaa,
retj×opj=spab, ri×opi=opaa, and rj×opj=opab, only
the role ri and the resource type reti has both been used
to access and support the specific operation opi, the role
rj and the resource type retj can then be both used
to access and support the operation opj . In motivating
scenario, the access of lawyer and the support of lease
agent on the operation of Return depends on the access
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of customer and the support of lease agent on the
operation of Lease Application. It means that, if lawyer
and lease agent are together to deal with the return of
the product, i.e, not the real product supplier and not real
product user, then the lease application must be submitted
directly by the customer and the product should be
provided by the lease agent. The application submitted
by the applicant in person can lower the risk of dispute
on the product of return based on a belief that, the more
the customer involves, the less the dispute can occur.
A group of role and resource type dependency policy can
be written as <Customer×Lease Application, Lease
Agent×Lease Application>→<Lawyer×Return,
Lease Agent×Return>.
III. SPECIFICATION OF SOAC-NET
In this section, we develop a process model named as
SOAC-Net to represent the authorization flow, where the
two types of authorization policies defined in last section
can be enforced. SOAC-Net is divided into three parts,
role-flow, resource type-flow, and constraint-flow. In SOAC-
Net, a role-flow and a resource type-flow are derived from
the execution sequence of the operations and associated
authorization mappings, i.e. the mappings between roles and
operations, and the mappings between resource types and
operations. These two types of flows are tightly synchronized
with the execution sequence (control flow) of the operations.
But they are not the same as the control flow since they have
capability to manage the sequence of role accesses and the
sequence of resource type supports within one operation,
where the control flow can only be used to coordinate
the execution sequence between operations. Constraint-Flow
is used to represent the various authorization dependency
policies based on the role-flow and resource type-flow.
A role-flow is defined as a sequence of role accesses on
specific operations of BP and is constructed based on two
steps (See Fig. 3).
Step 1 The roles accesses on the operations is sequenced based
on the operation execution sequence, where the roles
that can access the same operation are put together.
The role access on operation can be obtained from the
given authorization mappings, i.e. the mapping between
the role and the operation (See Line 5 in Algorithm 1).
Step 2 If the relationship of the roles put together for accessing
the same operation is exclusive choice, then role or-
split and role or-join are used to set up these roles
accesses on the operation into different branches. One
of the branches will be selected during the role-flow
execution. On the other hand, if multiple roles need
to concurrently access the same operation, role and-
split and role and-join are used to divide these role
accesses on the operation into different branches that
execute concurrently. These four operators can be used
as nested structure. By using this construction method,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Constructing Role-Flow
Input: R, OP, OPA⊆OP×R, F⊆OP→OP
Output: E⊆OPA→OPA
{Based on the operation’s execution sequence F, and
the mapping OPA between Role R and Operation OP,
a sequence of role accesses E is constructed}
Steps:
1: while NOT the end of F do
2: /*Check if the operation opi is mapped with roles by
using the inverse function of assigned op(r∈R)*/
3: if assigned op−1(opi ∈OP)= ∅ then
4: /*Select all roles that are mapped with opi into R
′
,
a subset of Role R. */
5: ∃ R′⊆R, ∀ ri∈R′ , ri×opi=OPA′⊆OPA, ∀ rj∈R-
R
′
, rj × opi ⊆OPA;
6: /*Relationship() is a recursive function on finding
all relationships of Exclusive-Choice or Concur-






,W); /* Based on the set of role
R
′
and the set of relationships W, the roles mapped





10: Next(opi∈ OP); /*Select the next operation F*/
11: end while
a role-flow is developed that can not only synchronize
the execution sequence of the operations, but can also
manage the role accesses within one operation (See
Line 7 in Algorithm 1).
In role-flow, the operation is used to pass from one role
access to the other depending on which operation should be
accessed by the specific role. The synchronization between
role-flow and control-flow of the operations can then be
ensured at runtime. Here below, we present an algorithm
to construct role-flow (See Algorithms 1).
A resource type-flow is defined as a set of resource
type supports on specific operations, and its construction
method is similar to the method of constructing a role-
flow. Hence, we will not describe the construction method
for resource type-flow in details. In resource type-flow,
the operation is also used to pass from one resource type
supports to the other depending on which operation should
be supported by the specific resource type. This can ensure
the synchronization between resource type-flow and control-
flow of the operations at runtime. Due to space limit, we
ignore the algorithm to construct resource type-flow, which
is similar with the algorithm to construct role-flow.
Constraint-flow is constructed based on the authorization
dependency policies. A constraint node is used to link role
access or resource type support according to the specific
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Figure 3. Construction of Role-Flow
dependency policy that the constraint node represents. The
ingoing link of the constraint node comes from the depended
role access or resource type support; while the outgoing link
of the constraint node points to the depending ones. When
the depended role access or resource type support finishes
dealing with specific operation, the constraint node will be
activated by the ingoing link. Through the outgoing link of
the constant node, the depending role access or resource type
support can be available on specific operations when they
are needed. Otherwise, they are not available.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate an example of SOAC-Net based
on the scenario in motivating example section. We use white
circles to represent role accesses in role-flow, and grey
circles with horizon strips to represent resource type supports
in resource type-flow. The blue circles with vertical strips
are used to represent various types of dependency policies
in constraint-flow. The operations are transferred within
the SOAC-Net, when they are accessed or supported by
specific role or resource type in role-flow and resource type-
flow. The authorization synchronization policies are enforced
when the operations are transferred within role-flow and
resource type-flow. All authorization dependency policies
in motivating example are explicitly illustrated in Fig. 4
as constraint-flow. For example, for role dependency policy
Guarantor×Lease Application→Guarantor×Monthly
Bill, a constraint node is used to link the guarantor
access on the operation of Lease Application with the
guarantor access on the operation of Monthly Bill (See
Fig. 4). In that case, the node in role-flow that represents
the guarantor access on the operation Monthly Bill is
restricted by an extra ingoing link from the constraint
node, where without the activation of this ingoing link, the
guarantor access on the operation Monthly Bill can not
be enabled.
IV. RELATED WORK
Role based access control [2], [5], [6] is a widely accepted
approach on business process authorization. In RBAC, users
acquire permissions through their roles to access the tasks in
workflow, rather than they are assigned permissions directly.
However, traditional RBAC models in process environment
deal with authorization of resources which belong to an indi-
vidual organization. In web service paradigm, the resources
normally spread over multiple organizations. Traditional
RBAC models can not be used directly as ready solutions for
authorization of BP. We will overview some representative
work in the follows.
An access control model CWS-RBAC was proposed in
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[3], where a global role is assigned to users to access a
sequence of operations, and a local role mapped from global
role is assigned to user to access the resources. The authors
in [4] propose another concept-Role Composition where
global role and local role are composed together. If the user
is assigned with a global role, then it automatically bears
the permissions of the bound local role on resource. In these
approaches, the ”role” as a concept is part of internal security
policy within a BP or a resource, and can not be identified by
others. Actually, the BP can only perceive the permissions
of resources based on credentials. The mapping of the
global role issued from BP with the local role generated
in resource is not realistic. In our proposed approach, we
introduce resource type (ReT) to express characteristics and
requirements of resources that are defined by BP, rather than
the resource.
In [7], the authors proposed a workflow authorization
model (WAM) and an authorization template (AT) to realize
the synchronization of role-flow with workflow. Authors in
[8] extends the above WAM by using colored petri-net to
enforce more policies, e.g. separation of duty (SoD) and
binding of duty (BoD). In [9], the authors propose a con-
strained workflow systems where local and global cardinality
constraints as well as SoD and BoD are enforced. However,
all above authorization models in workflow environment do
not take resource into account, and can not be used in web
service environment. The authorization dependency policies
are also missing in the existing models.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a business process authorization
model PASOAC to illustrate how user access and resource
support on business process is managed. Two types of
authorization constraints, synchronization and dependency,
are identified in PASOAC. A process model SOAC-Net
incorporated with PASOAC is presented to ensure that the
BP will not be interrupted by authorization issues through
enforcing synchronization and dependency policies. In the
future, SOAC-Net will be formalized by Petri-Net to facili-
tate its verification mechanism on examining if authorization
policies are defined properly in BP.
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